Analysis of military contracting procedures. by O'Connor, William Joseph Michael
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1965-04
Analysis of military contracting procedures.
O'Connor, William Joseph Michael
George Washington University
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11621
William Joseph Michael O'Connor









William Joseph Michael O'Connor
Bachelor of Science
University of Pennsylvania, 1954
A Thesis Submitted to the School of Government, Business
and International Affairs of The George Washington
University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Business Administration
April 15, 1965
Thesis directed by
Karl Stromsem, Ph. D.










Nearly one -third of the annual budget of the Department of Defense
is spent for the research, development, and production of weapons systems.
All but a very small fraction of these activities are carried out by private
industry under contract with the government. Over the years this contrac-
tual relationship has given birth to the so-called defense industry- -an
industry which in 1963 accounted for 3 per cent of the gross national
product.
No other industry is subject to as much governmental control as is
the defense industry. These controls stem from many different motives.
Some are designed to protect the public purse from being drained by pay-
ments of excessive or fraudulent profits. Others have as their purpose
the furtherance of social or economic objectives. Still others are con-
cerned with providing contractors with incentives to improve their per-
formance.
Each of these controls, if examined separately from the environ-
ment in which they function, appears to further the public interest. This
paper, however, focuses on the entire contractual environment and the
resultant interaction of these various control devices. This total picture
is quite different. The conflicts that exist among these controls often
breed inefficiency and many of the objectives sought to be accomplished
ii

through them are in fact unattainable because of them.
The general subject matter of government contracting procedures
has never before been the topic of research by members of the Navy
Graduate Financial Management Program. In view of the large portion of
the Navy budget that is spent on procurement of weapon systems, it is
difficult to understand this lack of interest. If this paper serves no other
purpose than to kindle the desire of some future student to study the sub-
ject in depth, then the effort expended in researching and writing it has
been worthwhile.
A wider knowledge by responsible officers of how the government
procures its weapons system should eventually lead to more efficient pro-
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MILITARY PROCUREMENT: LAW AND REGULATION
Historical Background
The statutory basis governing all peacetime military procurement
is the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 as amended. This law
was a radical departure from the pre-war procurement legislation and
was based on the experience gained during World War II.
Prior to 1939, the laws controlling the procurement actions of the
War and Navy Departments were a tangled net of confusing and often con-
flicting statutes. The general rule permeating all of these legislative
pronouncements was the requirement for assuring maximum competition
on the part of suppliers. Government agencies were enjoined to formally
and extensively advertise their supply and material needs. Prospective
vendors submitted sealed bids and the contract was awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder. The Congress believed this method of procurement
the best means of getting the maximum return for each dollar spent while
simultaneously awarding contracts impartially among vendors and mini-
mizing opportunities for fraud.
The few exceptions to this rule were often the results of pressure
brought to bear by special interest groups or the exigencies of a specific
U. S.







situation, and were not conducive to encouraging efficiency and economy
of operations.
As the spectre of war arose in Europe, Congress became aware
that many of its laws severely hampered efforts to prepare this country to
meet the aggressive actions of other nations. Initially it acted timidly to
loosen the bonds of restrictive peacetime procurement laws. By the Pub-
lic Works Act of April 25, 1939, it authorized the Secretary of the Navy to
negotiate a cost-plus -fixed-fee contract for the construction of public
works outside the United States. Procurement by negotiation offered
contracting officers considerable discretion in selecting and dealing with
suppliers, giving them an authority which heretofore had been severely
restricted. The authorization, however, was subject to several limita-
tions: (1) negotiations were to take place among a minimum of three quali-
fied contractors; (2) the fee could not exceed 10 per cent of the estimated
cost; (3) the President's personal approval of the contract was required;
and (4) a naval officer was required to participate in the board of directors
meetings in order to safeguard the interests of the United States. Restric-
tive as this legislation was, it marked the turning point toward more effi-
cient procurement policies.
Congress, recognizing that a broad industrial base in the aircraft
industry was necessary to meet wartime requirements, next passed the
1
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"Multiple Awards Act. " This Act authorized the Secretaries of the War
and Navy Departments to award contracts for the production of aircraft
and aircraft parts not only to the lowest responsible bidder, but to the
three lowest bidders --thus creating a potential for rapid expansion.
2
The so-called Speed-up Act followed in 1940. This empowered the
President, when he deemed it in the national interest, to authorize the
Secretary of the Navy to negotiate contracts for the procurement, repair,
or alteration of ships and aircraft, disregarding the existing requirements
of competitive bidding. Furthermore, it gave the President the power to
authorize the Secretary to make advance payments of up to 30 per cent of
the contract price to the contractors.
In December, 1941, with the United States entry into the war, the
Congress removed the remaining restrictions on procurement by drafting
the First War Powers Act. The President signed it into law on December
3
18, 1941. Under Title II of this Act, the President could authorize any
agency of the government engaged in the war effort:
... to enter into contracts and into amendments and modifica-
tions of contracts heretofore or hereafter made and to make advance
progress and other payments thereon, without regard to the provi-
sion of law relating to the making, performance, amendment or
modification of contracts, whenever he deems such action would
facilitate the prosecution of the war.
1
U. S.
, 54 Statutes 45 (1939).
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U. S. , 54 Statutes 676 (1940).
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The President granted this authority to the military services by Executive
Order 9001. The few limitations imposed were of a public policy nature
and did not reflect any lack of confidence in the ability, judgment, or integ-
rity of the services. Without question, this Act provided immeasurable
assistance in the successful conclusion of the war.
Two important lessons were learned by the government in function-
ing under the First War Powers Act. First, negotiated contracts proved
not only invaluable in broadening the base of industrial production so essen-
tial to the successful waging of war, but they also offered other benefits
which aided both efficiency and economy during wartime operations.
Secondly, the military were capable of sound judgment and business sense
in exercising the broad procurement powers extended to them.
After the cessation of hostilities, the continuing state of world ten-
sion dictated the maintenance of a large military force at a high level of
readiness. A return to the inflexible pre-war procurement policies would
have been a detriment to military preparedness.
The Armed Services Procurement Act
In January, 1947, the Armed Services Procurement Bill was intro-
duced into Congress. Its purposes were to place all military peacetime
procurement under one statute, thereby providing for coordination and
uniformity of practice among the services; to eliminate archaic laws that
prevented efficiency and economy; and to provide the armed services with
sufficient flexibility in meeting their procurement needs. The bill, after
'.
more than a year of hearings conducted by the Armed Services Committees
of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, was passed and signed
into law by the President on February 19, 1948.
The Act reaffirmed formal advertising as the normal peacetime
procurement method. It provided, however, for procurement by negotia-
tion where experience proved it was a superior or necessary means of ob-
taining supplies or services. Specifically, the Act, after several amend-
ments, now cites 17 circumstances under which negotiation is permissible.
In brief, these are:
1. If determined to be necessary during periods of
national emergency
2. If the public exigency will not admit of the delay
incident to advertising
3. If the contract price does not exceed $2, 500
4. If the contract is for personal or professional
services
5. If the contract is for service to be rendered by
an educational institution
6. If the supplies or services are purchased and
used outside the United States
7. If the contract is for medical supplies
8. If the supplies to be purchased are for resale
9. If the contract is for perishable foods
•:
•
610. If the contract is for supplies or services for
which it is impossible to secure competition
11. If the contract is for experimental, research,
or development work
12. Where the contract involves security classifications
13. Where standardization of equipment and inter -
changeability of parts are determined necessary
14. For technical or special property requiring a sub-
stantial initial investment or an extended time period prepara-
tory to manufacture and it is determined that formal advertis-
ing would result in additional cost to the government or an
unacceptable delay of procurement
15. Where bids received under formal advertising are
unreasonable or evidence collusion among competitors
16. Where a specific supplier must be kept available
because of a national emergency or in the interest of industrial
mobilization
17. If otherwise authorized by specific laws or statutes.
These provisions of the Act are its most important features, since they
provide the military with a reasonable degree of flexibility in conducting
procurement functions. This power to negotiate has been and is a major
factor in the development of complex weapons systems.
..
The Renegotiation Act of 1951, as Amended
In an effort to eliminate excessive profits from contracts or sub-
contracts with the military and other specified government departments,
the Congress passed an Act in 1951 establishing the Renegotiation Board.
This Board, an independent executive agency, determines on an annual
basis, in accordance with rather broad statutory criteria, what profits
earned under contracts and subcontracts subject to the Act are considered
to be excessive, and orders them refunded to the government. Appeals
from the decisions of the Board may be made to the United States Tax
Court.
Other Acts
The laws directly or indirectly relating to procurement by the mili-
tary are too many for enumeration here and most are beyond the scope of
this paper. The following are some of the more important ones, with a
brief explanation of their relation to procurement:
2
Public Law 85-804. --This Act governs procurement during
periods of national emergency. It contains many of the provisions of
Title II of the First War Powers Act.
3The Walsh Healey Public Contracts Act . --This Act restricts
contracts from being awarded to contractors other than those normally
U.S., 50 United States Code, sees. 1211-1233.
U.S., 72 Statutes 972.
3
U.S., 41 United States Code, sec. 35-45.
'
8engaged in providing the materials sought. It requires payment of certain
minimum wages to employees and safe working conditions, and prohibits
employment of children and convicts.
The Eight -Hour
_
Law o f 1912, as Amended. --This Act requires pay-
ment of overtime wages to the contractor's employees working beyond eight
hours a day.
2
The Anti-Kickback Acts . --These acts prohibit the inducing of pay-
ments from employees or subcontractors as a condition for employment.
3
The Buy American Act, as Amended. --This Act requires all mate-
rials purchased under government contracts to be of United States origin
unless such requirement is inconsistent with the public interest.
4
The Small Business Act of 1958 . --This Act states that it is the pol-
icy of the government to provide small businesses with a fair share of. go-
ernment contracts and subcontracts, and requires that prime consideration
be given small business companies located in labor surplus areas.
5The Hebert Act of 1962. --The most important features of this Act
are: (1) Those contractors and subcontractors subject to its provisions must
U.S., 40 United States Code, sec. 321-325.
2
U. S. , 18 United States Code 874; 40 United States Code 276C; 41
United States Code, sees. 51-54.
3
U. S.
, 41 United States Code , sees. lOa-lOd.
4




10 United States Code, sec. 2306(F).
•
certify the accuracy, currency, and completeness of their cost or pricing
data; (2) it permits an adjustment to the contract price in those cases where
the price was significantly increased because of the inaccuracy, incomplete-
ness, or noncurrency of the data.
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) establishes for
the Department of Defense uniform policies for carrying out the provisions
of the Armed Services Procurement Act and establishes policies for those
areas of procurement not covered by the Act. It embraces all aspects of
the procurement process and applies to all purchases and contracts made by
the Department of Defense for the procurement of supplies or services which
obligate appropriated funds, the sole exception being transportation services.
Revisions and additions are drafted by a committee consisting of
representatives of the military services. Normally, industry representa-
tives are consulted prior to making any changes.
Procurement Directives
Procurement directives are issued by the military services to
disseminate:
1. Internal procurement management instructions.
2. Procurement instructions for specialized com-
modity areas not specifically covered by ASPR.
3. Interim procurement instructions essential to





to the ASPR committee.
4. Material determined by the ASPR committee to be
inappropriate for ASPR coverage and approved for inclusion
in military department directives.
Formal Advertising
As the term "formal advertising" indicates, it is a method of pro-
curement requiring the use of formal and legalistic procedures. Under this
method the requirements are delineated and qualified vendors are invited to
make bids. The requirements are fully publicized by posting in public
places and newspaper advertisements. Those interested submit sealed bids
which are publicly opened on the specified date and the contract is awarded
to the responsible bidder whose bid is most advantageous to the government
considering both price and other factors.
The effectiveness of formal advertising as a method of procurement
is dependent upon: (1) an adequate number of qualified bidders; (2) fully
competitive pricing on the part of the bidders; (3) definitive supply or mate-
rial requirements which may be published; and (4) the availability of time
for advertisement and receipt and opening of bids.
Two-step formal advertising. --This procurement method is compar-
atively new, being first employed in I960. The first step consists of the
request, submission, and evaluation of a technical proposal without regard
to price. The second phase is the formally advertised procurement, con-





Negotiation may be broadly defined as all contracting and purchasing
not made by formal advertising. Under conditions previously enumerated, it
offers the government considerable discretion in selecting and bargaining
with vendors. It does not preclude competition, but rather offers the bene-
fits of competition on an informal basis. Where the conditions necessary
for formal advertising are not met, negotiation substitutes an adequate cost
and price analysis of potential contractors' proposals to obtain the materials
or services needed at fair and reasonable prices.
Negotiation is a valuable tool for planning the fulfillment of future
needs. Dependable sources of supply can be developed through selected
placement of contracts. Likewise, competition may be fostered in those
products for which the military agency presently depends on a single source
of supply. Training contracts, which familiarize a manufacturer in the pro-
duction of critical wartime items, may also be awarded, thereby facilitating
industrial mobilization.
The objective of procurement by negotiation is identical to that of
formal advertising --to meet military procurement requirements on the best
available terms. Successful negotiation, unlike formal advertising, is not
solely dependent on the interaction of competitive forces, but rather on the





The contract is the chief administrative vehicle by which the govern-
ment procures its necessary supplies, services, and weapons systems from
private industry. The wide variety of items procured, the high unit dollar
value of many, and the frequent novelty which requires marked advances in
the state of the art necessitate a wide range of contract types to properly
balance the public interests with private commercial interests.
The purpose of this chapter is to enumerate and explain the contract
types used in procurement actions subject to the Armed Services Procure-
ment Act and to point out some of the major considerations which influence
contract selection. In addition, the monetary incentives offered to the con-
tractors under each type will be discussed.
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation groups the various
contract types into two main classes based on their compensation features.
These are: (1) fixed-price contracts and (2) cost-reimbursement contracts.
In order to facilitate the explanation of the various contracts, this classifi-





Firm Fixed-Price Contracts (FFP)
This contract type provides for a price that is not subject to adjust-
ment by reason of the cost experience of the contractor during performance
of the contract. Depending on specific contract provisions, either a fixed
sum of money per unit delivered or a fixed dollar lump-sum payment upon
total contract completion is paid to the contractor.
Such a contract is appropriate where reasonably definite specifica-
tions are available and where there exists a highly reliable basis for pricing.
It is generally used in the procurement of standard commercial items or
those military items for which accurate production and cost information
is available.
Modified Fixed-Price Contracts
The two conditions appropriate for an FFP contract do not always
remain static, particularly when the procurement is spread out over a long
time period. Specifications and costs are always subject to change in the
long run and therefore it is appropriate to provide for price adjustments
under certain conditions. These modified fixed-price contracts will now be
discussed.
Fixed -Price with Provisions for Escalation
Included in this fixed-price contract are provisions for the adjust-
ment, either upward or downward, of the contract price upon the occurrence
.
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of specified contingencies. Generally a reasonable ceiling is imposed on any
price increase but there is no floor limiting downward price adjustments.
Escalation provisions take into account, for example, the possibility
of increased costs resulting from wage negotiations or a rise in material
prices during the term of the contract. Where there is a probability of such
an increase in costs, the contractor negotiating a firm fixed-price contract
would include an allowance for it. The government would be unwilling to
accept such an allowance since it is based on a probability, not an actuality.
An important point to note is that escalation provisions do not provide
protection to contractors against contingencies arising from their own inac-
curate estimates of cost.
Fixed-Price with Provisions for Redetermination (FPR)
Z
Currently there are two types of redetermination clauses which are
permitted to be used:
1 . Prospective periodic price redetermination at stated intervals
(Type A). --Under this contract type, a firm fixed-price is negotiated for
the initial period of the contract. It also provides for future price deter-
minations, either upward or downward from the original price at specified
intervals during the remaining contract term. The insertion of this clause
A number of prescribed escalation clauses designed for varying
circumstances are stated in ASPR 7-106, 107.
2ASPR 3-404. 5 - . 7 set forth the conditions for use of price redeter-




is appropriate where the contract is for quantity production and it is possible
to negotiate fair firm fixed prices for the initial but not any subsequent
period. As a matter of practice, the intervals between price redetermina-
1
tions are generally one year.
2. Retroactive p r ice redetermination after completion (Type E). --
Under this contract type, a price ceiling is established; however, the final
price is determined by negotiation after completion of the contract. In
practice this is a rarely used contract type since it does not offer any mone-
tary incentive to the contractor to reduce cost below the established ceiling.
It is of use only when the contract is for such a small quantity and the time
of completion so short that use of Type A redetermination clause is
2
impractical.
Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts (FPIF)
Under this contract type there is initially negotiated a target
(expected) cost, a target profit based on the target cost, a price adjustment
formula, and a maximum price ceiling. Upon completion of the contract,
the final cost is negotiated and the profit determined in accordance with the
price adjustment formula.
The incentive lies in the price adjustment formula which increases
the contractor's profits as actual costs are decreased below target and
Gilbert A. Cuneo, Government Contracts Handbook (Washington,
D. C. : Machinery and Allied Products Institute and Council for Technolog-






decreases his profit as costs increase above target. The formula is so
constructed as to provide for sharing between contractor and the government
of the benefits of cost reductions and the burden of increased costs. The
negotiated maximum price, however, limits the government liability.
Table 1 illustrates an FPIF contract with cost control incentives.
The more complex forms of this contract type are those which simul-
taneously apply monetary incentives to cost, schedule, and product perform-
ance, as outlined in a Department of Defense contract guidebook:
The purpose of combining incentives is obvious. Successful per-
formance of almost any contract consists in completing a satisfactory
end item or service at a reasonable cost and within certain time lim-
its . Since all the factors are closely dependent on each other, a con-
tract that places too heavy a premium on one risks loss of control
over the other two. It follows, then, that a properly structured
multiple -incentive contract should serve two basis purposes. First,
it should motivate the contractor to strive for outstanding results in
all three incentive areas; in other words, his objective at the outset
should be to earn maximum profit, and the contract should be struc-
tured so that there is some possibility that he can do this. Second, if
it becomes apparent to the contractor that outstanding results cannot
be achieved in all areas, the incentive structure should compel deci-
sions as between cost, time, and performance that are in consonance
with the overall procurement objectives of the Government. Realiza-
tion of the first objective depends largely on the range of effective-
ness established for each incentive element and the probability of
achieving outstanding performance in all incentive areas. Realiza-
tion of the second purpose, on the other hand, turns mainly on the
relative weights assigned to each incentive element, since these
weights, along with the separate ranges of incentive effectiveness,
will establish the various break-even points for trade-off decisions
between cost, schedule, and performance. *
This contract type is best used in procurement situations where there
can be attached to the target cost, schedule, and performance a relatively
U. S. Department of Defense, Incentive Contracting Guide (Wash-

















Price Ceiling (125% of Target













25% of Cost Underrun
70,000
25,000
Total Profit: $ 95,000
Government Cost:
Actual Contractor's Cost $900,000
Contractor's Profit 95, 000
Total Cost to Government: $995, 000
Note: A cost overrun would require similar calculations; however, thii
would result in a decrease of the contractor's profit.
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high level of confidence; thus, the contractor should assume a significant
portion of the responsibility for his overall performance.
Cost Reimbursement Contracts
This major class of contract types provides for the payment to the
contractor of all allowable costs incurred in the performance of the contract.
Not all costs normally considered ordinary and necessary for the conduct of
a business enterprise are determined to be allowable under ASPR. Inter-
est and other financial costs, donations, and advertising expense are exam-
ples of costs which are generally unallowable.
The contractor must maintain a cost accounting system which segre-
gates the costs applicable to each contract so that joint costs may be prop-
erly allocated among several government contracts and/or commercial con-
tracts. His accounting records are subject to periodic reviews by govern-
ment auditors to determine the allowability and allocatability of all recorded
costs and to uncover any evidence of waste or inefficiency. This type of
audit is peculiar to cost reimbursement contracts only and should be differ-
entiated from the post contract audit function performed by the General
Accounting Office (GAO). All contracts, regardless of type, are subject to
audit by the GAO any time within three years of completion.






The estimated total cost arrived at through negotiation establishes
the price ceiling which cannot be exceeded without prior government
approval. This feature is common to all cost reimbursement contracts.
No fee is paid to the contractor under a pure cost contract.
This contract is most commonly used for research and development
work with educational or other non-profit institutions.
Cost Sharing Contr act
This type of contract also does not provide for a fee payment to the
contractor. In addition, the reimbursement of allowable costs is limited
to a predetermined percentage stated in the contract.
The cost sharing contract is used where the potential commercial
benefits accruing to the contractor through his joint endeavor with the gov-
ernment in a particular research or production activity offsets the need for
full reimbursement of his expenses.
Cost-Plus-a-Fixed-Fee Contract (CPFF)
This contract provides for the payment of a specified dollar amount
fee in addition to all allowable costs. The amount of the fee is fixed and the
actual costs incurred in the performance of the contract do not change it.
The fee may be adjusted only as a result of changes in the work to be per-
formed which are initiated subsequent to the signing of the basic contract.
The fee for research, experimental and developmental type work is




minor exceptions, the maximum statutory fee for other works under this
contract type is 10 per cent of estimated costs. By regulation, however,
the Department of Defense has limited these fees to a maximum of 10 per
cent and 7 per cent, respectively.
This contract type is appropriate where the nature of the work to be
performed generates extremely low confidence cost estimates. The finan-
cial risk in such a situation is so great that contractors would be unwise to
accept any part of it and therefore the government must assume it all.
Cost-Pius -Incentive-Fee Contract (CPIF)
This contract type utilizes a target cost, target fee, and a fee adjust-
ment formula. In addition, both minimum and maximum fees are deter-
mined. Upon completion of the contract, the fee adjustment formula is
applied to the total actual costs to determine the contractor's fee. Actual
costs falling below targeted costs result in a higher-than-targeted fee, and
vice versa. In no case, however, may the final fee fall outside the nego-
tiated maximum and minimum limits.
It is appropriate to use this contract type where the range of cost
estimates is large but no so large as to justify use of a cost-plus -fixed-fee
contract and where there is a reasonable basis to assume that the contractor
can control, through efficient management, a significantly large portion of
the total costs.
Complex forms of this contract employ multiple incentive provisions,







In addition to the aforementioned contracts, there are other types
referred to as time-and-materials, labor -hour, and open contracts. These
are of minor importance both to the overall procurement picture and to the
subject matter of this paper; therefore, no discussion of their nature or
application is deemed necessary.
Major Contrasts
At the outset of this chapter the distinction between fixed-price and
cost-reimbursement contracts was stated to be in their compensation fea-
tures. A further distinction should now be evident. Under a fixed -price
contract the vendor is required to provide the government with the product
or service regardless of the actual costs incurred in completing the contract.
On the other hand, no such liability exists under a cost-reimbursement con-
tract. The contractor's obligation ends when actual costs coincide with the
estimated or targeted costs regardless of the degree of contract completion.
In practice, additional funds are usually made available to allow for com-
pletion.
Fixed-price contracts require definite specifications and reasonably
accurate cost information. The contractor bears the greater part of the
financial risk and comparatively little administrative control is exercised
by the government.
In contrast, cost-reimbursement contracts are used where the





The financial risk is borne by the government and therefore it exercises
significant administrative control through the close surveillance of the
contractor's cost and performance.
Incentive Contracts
The major contract types lend themselves to another classification
based on the incentives offered to the contractors to control cost, improve
performance and/or better delivery schedules. The contracts which offer
no incentives are:
1. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee
2. Fixed-Price with Provisions for Retroactive Price
Redetermination after Completion (Type E)
Those contracts which provide incentives are listed in descending
order of the magnitude of incentives offered:
1. Firm-Fixed-Price
2. Fixed-Price with Provisions for Prospective Price
Redetermination at Stated Intervals (Type A)
3. Fixed-Price with Provisions for Escalation
4. Fixed-Price-Incentive
5. Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee.
From the preceding discussion of contract types it can be readily
seen that the CPFF and the FPR(E) offer no incentives to the contractor to
improve performance in any manner. His fee is either predetermined, as
in the case of a CPFF contract, or based on actual costs (up to the
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established ceiling) under an FPR(E) contract. Outstanding performance
on the part of the contractor does not improve his profit position.
It may be argued that these contracts offer an incentive for poor per-
formance in certain situations. A contractor with a backlog of orders insuf-
ficient to maintain the present level of activity might be tempted to stretch
out the contract in order to have it absorb a greater amount of overhead
charges or to keep his employment level high in order to maintain his com-
petitive position for future contracts.
In contrast, the profit potential of a contractor operating under one
of the incentive contracts can be measurably affected by his overall per-
formance.
The firm-fixed-price contract obviously offers the greatest monetary
incentive since cost underruns accrue to the contractor as increased profit
while cost overruns decrease his profit or even result in losses. The fixed-
price redeterminable at stated intervals contract is analogous to a continuing
series of firm-fixed price contracts and therefore offers the same incentive
The fixed-price contract with provisions for escalation removes from the
profit or loss calculation only those costs which are largely uncontrollable
The terms profit and fee are generally used interchangeably in any
discussion of contracts. There is a distinction, however, which the reader
should be aware of. Fee is used in connection with cost reimbursement
contracts. Those expenses incurred in connection with the contract but
determined by the government to be unallowable would be deducted by the






and most likely to change. It, too, offers much the same incentive as a
firm-fixed-price contract.
The fixed-price- incentive and the cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts
provide a sliding scale of profit through the price adjustment formula. The
fixed-price-incentive contract offers the greater performance incentive
since larger profits are awarded for superior performance and losses may
result from poor performance. The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract
awards a higher fee for superior performance, but the size of this fee is
limited, in comparison with that under a fixed -price -incentive contract.
Poor performance results in a much smaller fee, or in rare instances no
1
fee, not xn a loss.
The exception is where the size of the fee is insufficient to cover
the unallowable expenses incurred under the contract. In any case the





During the past few years, several major innovations in procurement
methods and policy have been made. This chapter will discuss these
changes and their supporting rationale.
The Need for Change
During the recent past, the United States experienced a rapidly ex-
panding and changing technology coupled with the need for the development
of complex weapons systems. The entire pattern of future warfare was
seen to be altered. Advances were required in technological areas thereto-
fore considered to be of little practical value. Missiles and electronics
were overtaking aircraft as the major hardware item.
A greater portion of the procurement dollar had to be devoted solely
to research and development. By 1959, 31 per cent of the total expenditures
on aircraft and missiles was applied to this category. The rapidity of tech-
nological breakthroughs generated many changes in defense plans. Defense
contractors could no longer expect to combine relatively low-cost research
and development activities with long-term production runs. The financial
In 1953 missiles and electronics accounted for 12 per cent of the





risk involved in undertaking a large-scale research and development program
without any assurance of a production contract became prohibitive. The gov-
ernment's overriding requirement for a strong military posture, however,
called for greater effort in this area.
These factors precluded any accumulation of reasonably accurate
pricing data on which to negotiate contracts. Contractors demanded and
received the protection of cost-plus -fixed-fee contracts. The growth of
cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts as a percentage of total dollar awards during
this period was phenomenal, approximately doubling from 1955 to 1961,
when it reached a peak of 38 per cent of the total procurement dollar.
As might be anticipated, many large cost and schedule overruns
were experienced. An Air Force study of 171 cost-plus -fixed-fee contracts
with an aggregate estimated cost of $3, 900 million incurred actual costs of
$4, 600 million, or an average of 18 per cent overrun.
In an independent study of 12 of the most advanced and highly complex
major weapons systems, the investigators concluded that the average actual
costs of development were 320 per cent of the original estimates and deliv-
2
ery schedules slipped by an average factor of 1. 4 times.
Hearings before the Procurement Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, U. S. Senate, 86th Congress, 2d Session, Feb. 8-9
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, I960), p. 271.
2
Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962), p. 22.
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These studies and similar ones left little doubt that new methods
were necessary to bring about efficiency and economy in defense procure-
ment. This task became the responsibility of the Honorable Robert S.
McNamara when he took the oath of office as Secretary of Defense in
January, 1961. The remainder of this chapter will concern itself with the
major changes made to the procurement process during the past four years.
Program Definition
Experience had shown that contractors, under the pressure of com-
petition, tended to underestimate the cost and time for developing an opera-
tional weapons system and overestimated its performance capabilities.
Numerous contractors, in response to the government's solicitation for
proposals, submitted lengthy explanations of their approach to the problem.
More often than not, these individual proposals were so diverse and lacking
in specifics that it was impossible for government procurement personnel
to properly evaluate them. The contract awarded under such circumstan-
ces frequently lacked a precise definition of the task and frequently substan-
tial time and money were expended before a basic fallacy in the selected
approach was uncovered.
Program definition is aimed at eliminating these deficiencies. In
a word, it is contracted planning. Those contractors who have demon-
strated the competence and ability to manage successfully the development
program under consideration are awarded fixed-price program definition





The product of these contracts is information on which to judge the
overall technical and financial feasibility of the program and the selection
of the prime contractor, if warranted. The data given in the Figure on the
succeeding page are representative of the scope and nature of the informa-
tion to be delivered by the individual firms under a program definition con-
tract. Program definition, therefore, has as its major purpose the conver-
sion of the vast store of complex technical information and forecast of
military requirements into a sound, orderly, and manageable program plan.
Presently the program definition requirement is limited to those
projects whose combined estimated costs for research, development, test,
and evaluation exceed $25 million. The Department of Defense, however,
encourages the informal application of program definition principles to
smaller programs on a limited detail and selective information basis.
Incentive Contracts
In June 1961 the Secretary of Defense in his address to the National
Security Industrial Association, Joint Industry-Defense Department Sympo-
sium, stated:
I have great faith in the efficiency of the profit motive. I believe
we have not yet allowed enough scope for it in our procurement poli-
cies. I am prepared to give full support to appropriate profit ratios
for truly effective and efficient performance by contractors. *
The concluding address to this symposium was delivered by the
Honorable Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations
Address delivered at NSIA-DOD sponsored symposium on "The








Partial List of Information To Be Included in Contractors'
Final Reports under Project Definition
1. A list of each of the end items required for operation and maintenance.
2. Performance specifications for each of the end items.
3. PERT /Cost program plan for the development of all items contained
in the system or subsystem on which the contractor bid, indicating
events that interface with the work of other contractors*
4. A recommended plan for maintenance of the system based upon main-
tenance and logistics concepts established by the department.
5. The work breakdown structure for the development program as a whole.
6. Detailed cost estimates for the entire program derived from PERT/
Cost.
7. A milestone schedule derived from or consistent with PERT /Cost
networks.
8. Time-cost-performance trade-off decisions which have been made with
respect to subsystems and components.
9. Foreseeable technical problems, proposed solutions, including backup
efforts if necessary.
10. Other problems that cannot be defined or resolved during PDP.
11. Technical specifications and performance requirements for system and
subsystem support, including personnel training, logistics, spare
parts, documentation, facilities, training equipment, and so on.
12. Proposed schedule of production engineering and production tooling
with relation to the development program, if appropriate.
13. Contractor suggestions as to the specific features of an incentive
contract.





and Logistics). He spoke as follows:
... I feel it is mandatory that we increase our use of all present
incentive type contracts. There are very few situations in which
there is not opportunity to employ performance incentives, value
engineering, or a combination of these. Over the long run, a com-
pany's incentive to earn more is the keystone of its effort to produce
better products at lower prices.
Time has proven these words to be prophetic. During 1963 the shift
to incentive contracts reduced the volume of cost-plus -fixed-fee contracts
to 20. 7 per cent of the total dollar awards. Present planning calls for a
further reduction to 12. 3 per cent during 1965.
The previously mentioned studies of contractor performance under
cost-plus -fixed -fee contracts pointed out the major weakness of this pro-
curement approach. Contractors, being guaranteed reimbursement, over-
emphasized product performance at the expense of time and cost. This was
a natural tendency since the contractor by bettering performance parameters
improved his probability of a production order.
The underlying principle of incentive contracts is that contractors will
be spurred by the profit motive to meet or better performance, time, and
cost criteria or, where these elements are in conflict, make the optimum
trade-off decision among them from the standpoint of the government.
Evaluation of Contractor Performance
In August 1963, the Department of Defense announced that all con-
tractors thereafter engaged in major development projects would be evaluated
For a complete discussion of this subject, see Department of Defense
Guide to the Evaluation of the Performance of Major Development Contrac-
tors (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963).
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on the basis of performance under each contract.
The past performance of each contractor is now purported to be a
major consideration in the award of new contracts. This evaluation has as
its objective providing the contractor with a strong motivation for continued
excellent performance over the long run.
The military project manager is responsible for making the initial
evaluation of the contractor's performance. The contract terms relating to
cost, time, and product performance are the prime standards which are to
be applied to actual performance. The Contractor Performance Evaluation
Group, established within each military department and consisting of pro-
curement, legal, scientific, and engineering personnel, reviews each evalu-
ation. If the group considers it appropriate, it may conduct an independent
investigation of performance at the contractor's plant.
Upon completion of the review, a report is submitted to the contrac-
tor for his examination. Should a disagreement exist, the contractor
states his position by appending written comments. The military project
manager and the departmental evaluation group review the contractor's
comments and if there is a strong divergence of opinion, the evaluation
group has the option of conducting another field investigation.
The rather elaborate check and re-check procedures are designed to
counterbalance the possibility of an unfair evaluation.
Performance evaluation is applicable to development contracts which
exceed $5 million in a single year, or a total cost of $20 million.
-i
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The complete evaluation report, including the comments of all parties
concerned, is forwarded to the Contractor Evaluation Office of the Depart-
ment of Defense. Here it is reviewed for completeness and conformity to
established directives. After this review the information is stored in a data
bank and is available for use in evaluating bidders in subsequent competition.
Contractor evaluation is aimed also at providing short-run incentives
under cost-plus-fixed-fee and cost-plus -incentive-fee contracts. Experience
has shown that under both contract forms, competition has increased the
tendency to be over -optimistic in quoting cost, time, and performance fig-
ures. Since the targeted figures in these contracts become standards against
which performance is to be matched, there should be less inclination on the
part of contractors to continue this practice. In this sense the contractor's
evaluation reinforces the planning requirement imposed by program defini-
tion.
PERT
Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) is a management
device designed to facilitate the planning and control of major development
programs. Initially the technique was applied to schedule control only
(PERT /time); however, the outstanding results achieved under this appli-
cation of PERT led to its adoption as a cost control technique (PERT /cost),
as well.
"Contractor Evaluation Comments Asked, : ' Aviation Week and Space




All program definition contracts now require contractors to submit
detailed time and cost estimates derived from the PERT technique. Con-
tractors awarded development contracts must also periodically report to
the cognizant agency their actual performance as contrasted with their PERT
planned performance. Most contracts contain incentive clauses which call
for the accomplishment of specific events at given times (milestones) during
the term of the program.
Although a lengthy discussion of the technique is beyond the scope of
this paper, a brief examination of its principles and methods should provide
an appreciation of its value as a control device.
The starting point under PERT is a detailed definition of objectives.
Once defined, the project is broken down into work activities. An activity
is a unit of work within the responsibility of a single operating unit required
to complete a specified task. The time required for performance of each
activity is estimated and plotted in network form which portrays the sequence
of work to be performed and the interdependencies involved. The result is
a series of various paths from the beginning to the end of the project.
The longest time path through the network controls the schedule and
is therefore termed the "critical path. " A delay in this path creates a delay
in the entire project. The remaining paths are called 'slack paths. "
If the period required to complete the project exceeds the available
time, an analysis is made as to whether activity times can be shortened or






the time required by the critical path is shortened to less than a slack path,
that slack path becomes critical. The analysis is continued until the desired
completion date is met.
A schedule is then prepared and labor and material costs are estima-
ted. The costs are reviewed for the purpose of eliminating, where possi-
ble, overtime charges, premium payments on materials, etc. Elimination
of overtime is accomplished by rescheduling of activities in the slack paths
to periods when the manpower skills are not required by the critical activi-
ties. The knowledge of the quantity and schedule of consumption of materi-
als aids in determining economic order quantities and avoids any premium
payments to suppliers for filling rush orders. In all but relatively simple
projects, a computer is used to accomplish the calculations.
As the project progresses, periodic comparisons are made between
actual times and costs and their original estimates. This serves to identify
any potential overruns in time and/or costs early enough for management to
take corrective actions.
This planning and control technique is considered to be advantageous
2
to both the contractor and the government. For industry it imposes a rigid
discipline for considering all elements of effort and the interrelationships
required to accomplish the objectives. For the government it provides
A comprehensive treatment of this cost phase is given in the POD
and NASA Guide PERT Cost (Washington, D. C. , 1962).
2PERT Coordinating Group for Government Agencies, PERT Guide
for Management Use (Washington, D. C. , 1963), pp. 8-9.
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visable proof that a detailed planning job was accomplished. For both it




At the present time there are numerous conflicts between contract
regulations and administrative practices on the one hand, and the overall
long-run objective of securing the most defense per government dollar. on
the other. This chapter will analyze some of the more obvious of these.
Government by Contract
Chapter I enumerated several laws which are concerned primarily
with social and economic objectives and yet have a direct impact on procure
ment efficiency. An examination of the requirements imposed on govern-
ment contractors by the Small Business Act will serve to illustrate this
problem.
To comply with the spirit of this Act, the Department of Defense
established the Defense Subcontracting Small Business Program. The
objective of this program is to encourage wider participation on the part of
1
small business in government contracts. The Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulation was revised to give the Department regulatory authority
over the large contractors in the administration of the program.
Small business firms for purposes of this program are those





The so-called "Small Business Sub-Contracting Clause" is now
inserted in every contract of any consequence. Compliance with this clause
imposes heavy financial burdens on the prime contractors and even their
large subcontractors, and full amount of this must ultimately be absorbed
in the price paid by the government.
The contractor subject to the clause must actively solicit bids from
small business for all subcontracts and purchase orders exceeding $10, 000.
This entails maintaining up-to-date records of the names of all small busi-
ness firms certified by the government as competent to perform a given task.
Since the number of these firms is generally substantial for most types of
subcontracted work, the total amount of responses to any bid solicitation
is great. The time required to analyze these bids as to costs and schedules
is correspondingly large and therefore expensive.
The record-keeping responsibility of the contractor subject to the
clause is also significant. Full substantiation and an acceptable explana-
tion are required when small business concerns are not solicited or when
they are solicited but not awarded the contract. In some contracts the
government agency's approval is required before the placing of subcontracts
of $10, 000 or more if small business is not to be solicited.
Make-or-buy decisions on the part of the contractor require the con-






not regularly engaged in manufacturing the particular item, he is prohibited
from making it in-house if other firms can provide the item at a cost no
higher than that of the contractor.
Contractors must accept as factual the Certificate of Competency
issued by the Small Business Administration since new small business firms
do not have a trade reputation. What would appear to be a solid capability
to undertake a given type of work before the subcontract is awarded may not
materialize during the actual manufacturing process. In one instance, a
small business firm, certified to be competent, failed to meet the delivery
schedule for aircraft bomb racks. The schedule slippage exceeded three
months and resulted in storage rather than delivery of nearly forty aircraft.
The cost to the government for storage was $900 per month per aircraft.
The impact on military readiness was significant in this case.
The "Utilization of Concerns in Labor Surplus Area" clause, derived
from the same act, imposes equally difficult administration problems upon
contractors. When these requirements and those generated by other laws,
regulations, and administration policies based solely on social and economic
motives are viewed as a whole, efficiency in procurement is seen to be
unattainable.
The author was personally involved in this and several other
instances of inadequate performance by small business subcontractors




The purpose of incentive contracts is to encourage outstanding per-
formance on the part of the contractor, as the better the performance, the
higher the profits. In contrast with this policy of the Department of Defense,
there presently exists an independent government agency which has the power
to rescind these profits. This is the Renegotiation Board established under
the Renegotiation Act of 1951.
The principal objectives of the board are: (1) to ensure that fair
pricing prevails in government procurement; and (2) to prevent companies
from making excessive profits. The total annual profits of the contractor
are the concern of the board and not profits under specific contracts. No
distinction is made, therefore, between profits made under cost-plus -fixed-
fee and incentive -type contracts.
There are no statutory definitions of what constitutes excessive prof-
its. The law requires only that the following factors be considered:
Efficiency of the contractor . --Favorable consideration must be
given to the "efficiency of the contractor . . . with particular regard to
the attainment of quantity and quality production, reduction of costs, and
economy in the use of materials, facilities, and manpower. "
Reasonableness of costs and profits . --Consideration must be given
to the "reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular regard to vol-




Capital employed.. --Consideration must be given to "the net worth,
with particular regard to the amount and source of private and public capital
employed. "
Extent of risk assumed. --Another factor requiring consideration is
"the extent of risk assumed, including the risk incident to reasonable pricing
policies.
Contribution to the defense effort. --This consideration pertains to
"the nature and extent of contribution to the defense effort, including inven-
tive and developmental contribution and cooperation with the government and
other contractors in supplying technical assistance. "
Character of the business . --Consideration must be given to the
"character of the business, including source and nature of materials, com-
plexity of manufacturing techniques, character and extent of subcontracting
and rate of turnover. "
Consideration and evaluation of these factors involves personal judg-
ment on the part of the board members and their decisions are necessarily
arbitrary. So long as the Renegotiation Board operates under these nebulous
guidelines it will remain a barrier to a truly effective incentive program.
With program definition, PERT /Cost and the legal requirement that
contractors certify the accuracy of their pricing data, a strong case can be
made for the elimination of renegotiation of incentive contracts during peace-
time. All of these ensure fair pricing to the government and since its savings
are substantially greater than the contractor's increased profits, it is better
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to encourage larger profits than to discourage them through renegotiation
proceedings.
Negative Incentives
Proprietary data is defined by the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation as:
. . . data providing information concerning the details of a con-
tractor's secrets of manufacture such as may be contained in but
not limited to its manufacturing methods or processes, treatment
and chemical composition of materials, plant layout and tooling, to
the extent that such information is not disclosed by inspection or
analysis of the product itself and to the extent that the contractor
has protected such information from unrestricted use by others. *
In practice this has been interpreted to mean that any information
that can be gained through inspection and engineering analysis (reverse
engineering) is not proprietary. Furthermore, the government's mere
assertion that certain information can be obtained by reverse engineering,
regardless of the time and effort required to do it, places such information
2
in the non-proprietary category.
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation also defines two
classes of product information generally required by the services when
procuring military hardware. Operational data include the information
necessary for instruction, operation, and maintenance. Descriptive data
are defined as those which provide descriptive or design drawings or





specifications which, although not including proprietary data, "may
nevertheless be adequate to permit manufacture by other competent firms. "
Operational and descriptive data are considered to be non-
proprietary. Because of the broad interpretation of what is non-
proprietary information, the data contain, in most instances, as a result
of the pressure exerted by the buyer, sufficient technical data to permit
competitors to reproduce the item.
"While this practice might be defended in instances where the govern-
ment fully funded the necessary research incident to production, it cannot
be justified in instances where products have been developed through wholly
or partially funded company research.
In the pursuit of short-run economies, government procurement
personnel provide several firms with this information and then request
competitive bids for production contracts. Two recent examples of this
technique are the awarding of the Bullpup air-to-ground missile and a
missile target drone production contracts to Maxson Electronics Corpora-
tion.
The Bullpup was developed by the Martin Company and the target
drone by Beech Aircraft Corporation, both largely through company -funded
research. The Maxson Corporation does not engage in research to any
significant degree and therefore does not have to plan to recapture the
William J. Coughlin, "The History Lesson, ' Missiles and Rockets ,
October 26, 1964, p. 46.
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overhead incurred by this activity in its bids for production contracts.
Naturally, the Maxson Corporation underbid the original developers and was
awarded both contracts.
Practices like this tend to discourage research on the part of aero-
space companies. If this trend continues, it will mean that all military
research will necessarily be wholly funded by the government since the
financial risk incurred by a contractor will far outweigh the potential profits.
There is no guarantee that the government will gain even in the short
run by pursuing the policy of awarding a contract to the lowest bidder when
the original research was done by another firm. During pilot production
and testing, many changes are made to the developing company's design and
specifications. Because of one reason or another, some of these changes
are never recorded on the original engineering drawings and specifications.
The contractor winning the award may produce the item according to the
information provided, but there is no guarantee that the final product will
be as satisfactory as that of the original vendor. When unsatisfactory results
are obtained, the government must bear the additional expense for corrective
action, since the vendor has met all contract requirements. Engineering
and production experience, although not susceptible to quantitative measure-










In the previous chapter the process of contractor evaluation was
explained in some detail. Although the record -keeping and investigative
functions are new, the underlying purpose is merely to determine the busi-
ness reputation of a firm. The effectiveness of this device is dependent on
the manner in which the government employs it.
If the government does not impart sufficient importance to past per-
formance in selecting contractors for major programs, contractor evalua-
tion will have no value as an incentive device. Only if contractors can per-
ceive a direct relationship between past performance and future awards will
this procedure prove to be useful.
Past performance as an element of consideration in the awarding of
contracts is not new. Reputation has always been a factor in source selec-
tion but never a significant one. Studies by Peck and Scherer have pointed
out that greater emphasis has been given the technical attractiveness of the
concept and design of the project and to the engineering, managerial, and
physical resources available than to past performance.
In a typical selection involving ten firms, ten out of a possible
hundred points were assigned for weighing past performance. Nine com-
petitors received nine or ten points and one received eight. Such weighting
and distribution of points encourages a firm seeking a new program to place




emphasis on the factors which are more heavily weighed rather than on
performance reputation.
In his exhaustive study of this subject, Scherer concluded that the
correlation between past performance and the success the individual firm
has in acquiring new contracts is slight. He found only two instances
since the beginning of World War II in which unsatisfactory performance
resulted in a loss of market position. In his words:
Willingness and ability to adapt over time to major changes in
weapons technology appear to have been much more significant
determinants of survival in defense contracting than good perform-
ance at any moment in time. This finding has most important in-
centive implications. Competitive survival in the face of rapidly
changing technology demands that contractor management give first
priority not to achieving good performance in ongoing programs, but
to moving into promising new fields and thereby developing company
capabilities for winning programs of the future. The emphasis on




The reason for selecting contractors on the basis of past performance
is to provide companies with a long-run incentive. In any particular source
selection the aim is to achieve the best technical approach to the program,
subject to certain financial and time constraints. These objectives, there-
fore, are not always in harmony. Since awards have been based primarily
on factors other than the past performance, it would seem logical for
Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic
Incentives (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business






contractors competing for new programs to assign their most capable per-
sonnel to applied research and preparation of proposals rather than to man-
aging current programs. The emphasis placed on technical factors in source
selection is therefore in opposition to objectives of the contractor evaluation
program.
The contractor evaluation program also assumes a strong correlation
between past and future performance. Some evidence has been gathered
which makes such an assumption subject to doubt. Sometimes contractors
do perform successively satisfactory jobs. In other cases, a satisfactory
job is followed by a poor one, which in turn is followed by a satisfactory
one, etc. There is some evidence in these latter instances to indicate that
when a firm performs poorly in one program, it devotes considerable effort
to the subsequent contract in order to ensure success. Likewise, it is
sometimes evident that when success is achieved in one program there is a
tendency toward complacency in a subsequent program and a general unwill-
ingness to adopt new methods developed through advanced technology.
In view of the evidence to date it appears that contractor evaluation
will not provide a substantial long-run incentive to contractors. Two major
points support this conclusion. First, factors other than past performance
are and should be the major determinants of source selection. It is not in
the best interests of defense to accept an unattractive proposal merely






it cannot always be assumed that past performance is indicative of future
performance. Military decision makers are aware of this fact and therefore
will most likely continue to treat it as a minor consideration.
The Reverse Incentive Contract
Although in theory cost-plus -incentive -fee contracts should encourage
contractors to keep their costs low, in practice, the exact opposite may be
the case. This dichotomy between theory and practice is a result of the
government's practice of pricing individual contracts on a full absorption
basis while individual contractors are concerned with maximizing total prof-
its on all contracts over a given time period. An example of how contractors
may profit by overrunning their targeted cost will clarify this situation.
Assume that a cost-plus -incentive-fee contract is awarded on the
basis of the following cost breakdown:
Engineering labor $ 5, 000
Engineering overhead @ 150% 7, 500
Manufacturing labor 10,000
Manufacturing overhead @ 200% 20,000
Materials 2, 955
Subtotal: $45, 455
G. and A. @ 10% 4, 545
Total cost: $50,000
Target fee: 3, 500
Target price: $53, 500
The maximum and minimum profits are set at $5, 500 and $1, 500,
respectively, and the profit adjustment formula is 80%/20%. For each
The material in this section has been largely derived from Bruce
Backe's "Low Fees May Undermine Incentive Goal, ' Aviation Week and
Space Technology, January 11, 1965, p. 69.
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$1,000 reduction in cost below the target, the contractor receives an addi-
tional $200 fee.
Should the contractor reduce actual costs to $40, 000, he would gain
the maximum profit of $5, 500, representing a fee of 13. 75 per cent. On
the other hand, if he overruns the targeted price by $10, 000 for a total cost
of $60, 000, his fee would be $1, 500, or only 2. 5 per cent of cost. On the
surface this would appear to be a fair agreement for both parties.
The government profits by $16,000 if the contractor performs the
work for a cost of $40, 000, even though the fee percentage is nearly twice
that targeted. For the contractor, however, it is better to resort to the
overrun of $10,000 since, as stated previously, the contractor is concerned
with his total profit picture rather than profit on a specific contract.
Table 2 shows the combination of the cost-plus -incentive -fee contract
and the remainder of the contractor's business under the condition of a
maximum incentive fee of $5, 500. In this situation his total profit is
$105,000.
A contractor viewing the situation presented in Table 2 can take
measures to improve the profit picture. By increasing the direct expenses
of the cost-plus -incentive-fee contract, but holding the line on overhead
and general and administration expenses, his total profit picture changes
substantially. This may be done by keeping unneeded labor at work on the








Engineering labor $ 3,000 $ 100,000 $ 103,000
Engineering overhead @ 150% 4,500 150,000 154,500
Manufacturing labor 8, 000 200, 000 208, 000
Manufacturing overhead @ 200% 16,000 400,000 416,000
Materials 4,864 100,000 104,864
Subtotal: $36, 364 $ 950, 000 $ 986, 364
G. & A. @ 10% 3,636 95,000 98,636
Total Cost: $40,000 $1,045,000 $1,085,000
Sales price 45,000 1,145,000 1,190,500
Profit: $ 5,500 $ 100,000 $ 105,500
Since the government would allow the added overhead and general
and administrative contract elements to be recovered at the negotiated rates,
even though they are not spent, the total overhead recovered would go up.
The net result of this course of action is shown in Table 3.
The technical complexities of the program which originally led to the
selection of a cost-plus -incentive-fee contract would make it extremely diffi-














































$ 1,500 $ 112,819 $ 114,319
By increasing the allowable overhead and general and administration
expense by $12,819 on the cost-plus -incentive-fee contract, the contractor
has reduced by an equal amount the same expenses required to be recovered
by his remaining business. He has, therefore, increased his total profit by
$8,819. The government, on the other hand, now pays out $61, 500, an in-
crease of $8, 000 above the target price and $16,000 above the incentive price.
The post-contract audit of distributed overhead would recover
some of the money for the government. The portion is dependent on the
percentage of the total dollar value of contracts that are cost-reimbursement
'
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types. If, in the example, the cost-plus -incentive-fee contract was the only
cost-reimbursement contract, then the actual recoverable indirect cost
would be calculated as follows:
154 500
Engineering Overhead = ' = 147%
Manufacturing Overhead .' = 196%
QQ A -* A






When these rates are applied at the final settlement, the total price
to the government becomes $60, 753 and the contractor's profit for the period
is reduced by $747, which still is far less than his additional profit of $8,819
that was made by operating inefficiently.
One method of eliminating this reverse incentive is to use a profit
adjustment formula which would increase the contractor's share of savings
by an amount greater than he would receive in overhead reimbursement.
Using the initial estimated figures, the indirect expenses are calculated to
be 64 per cent of the total cost. For simplicity's sake, it is assumed that
the separate direct costs will maintain their estimated ratio with total
direct costs throughout the term of the contract. While this forecast is not
precise, it is close enough for practical purposes.
Under these circumstances, if the contractor is to be provided with
a positive incentive, the profit adjustment formula must call for the con-
tractor's share in underruns to be greater than 64 per cent. At exactly
64 per cent, his total profit picture does not change as a result of his
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performance, as shown by Table 4.
TABLE 4
PROFITS AT VARIOUS PERFORMANCE LEVELS


















































Another approach to solving this problem lies in the direct costing
of contracts. Under this method the contractor's estimated fixed and varia-
ble costs would be separated. The government would negotiate a fair price
for the contribution that a particular cost-plus -incentive-fee contract should
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make toward fixed costs. The government would also agree to pay all
variable contract costs and the contractor's fee would be tied to his ability
to hold down variable costs. Cost-plus -incentive fee contracts written in
this manner would eliminate the reverse incentive.
Inflexibility and Multiple Incentives
Multiple incentive contracts are designed to encourage the contractor
to produce a satisfactory item at a reasonable cost and within certain time
limits. Cost, time, and performance, however, are not independent varia-
bles but in most instances are directly related to each other. For example,
the delivery date may be advanced through the incurrence of overtime or
increased manpower costs, or performance may be improved by delaying
the delivery date so that newly developed subsystems may be installed.
The negotiation of a multiple incentive contract is a lengthy and
tedious process. When the final profit determination formula is agreed
upon, it becomes the standard against which the contractor, during the
term, of the contract, will evaluate trade-off alternatives. These decisions
are based on the priorities assigned each variable by the government. In
theory, decisions made under a multiple incentive contract should be advan-
tageous from the government's standpoint.
There are indications, however, that this is not a fact. The parame-
ters initially established and made an integral part of the contract are
always subject to change. A technological breakthrough, for examole, may
permit use of better subsystems and components, or intelligence agencies
.
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may modify their assessment of the enemy's potential threat. Flexibility
is therefore not only a desirable characteristic of a contract, but also a
necessary one.
The Department of Defense has recognized the problem imposed by
multiple incentives, as quoted in the Incentive Contracting Guide :
... a successful incentive arrangement demands that the need
for supplemental agreements be minimized. A too-heavy incidence
of changes, modifications, and misunderstandings during contract
performance will severely damage the effectiveness of the incentive
provisions, and, in addition, impose a heavy administrative burden
on both the government and the contractor. Thus the contract must
leave no doubt in the mind of either party as to precisely what is re-
quired and what steps will be taken to meet the requirements. And
this can be accomplished only if the business and technical aspects
of the procurement are carefully and completely planned in advance.
. . . it is not easy to derive a multiple incentive matrix wherein
the most profitable trade-off decision for the contractor will always
be coincident with the decision DOD would prefer. In fact, as con-
ditions change during the contract performance, the interrelation
between incentive elements may also change; and a relative weight-
ing pattern that was suitable when the contract was awarded may be
less satisfactory at a later time. 2
One of the most difficult problems in the administration of con-
tracts that contain incentive provisions is negotiating equitable
adjustments in the contract price (target cost and target fee) and /or
delivery schedule that result from contract changes. Changes are
troublesome enough under contracts that do not contain incentive
provisions, when only the price or fee and delivery schedule are at
issue; the problem is compounded under the simplest type of cost
incentive arrangement, when the effects of the change not only on
target costs and fee, but also on the maximum and minimum fees,
the sharing formula, and the confidence range must be determined.
. . . Introduction of a second incentive --for example, delivery-
-
I
U. S. Department of Defense, Incentive Contracting Guide (Wash-






complicates the process of adjudicating the change. Completing the
triangle, a change in performance incentives is perhaps the most
complex, and in combination with the other parameters, poses grave
problems. *
Knowing that technical and strategic uncertainties are characteristic
of any weapons development program, attempts to completely plan in advance
2
all business and technical aspects of a program appear unrealistic.
When detailed decision parameters are placed in the body of the con-
tract, changes brought about through external forces will either lead to
"grave problems" and 'heavy administrative burden or worse, discourage
program modification which would be acceptable on technical, financial,
3
or strategic merits.
Multiple incentives, then, introduce the undesirable element of
inflexibility in weapons development programs.
It might be argued that the parameters can be changed to fit the cur-
rent situation. Modification, however, is not an overnight process. Like
the development of the original parameters, it is a lengthy process which
requires the participation by high-level technical and program management
personnel. Personnel whose time could best be spent on administering the
project.
1





The 1963 revision to the Incentive Contracting Guide mentions the
complexity of revising multiple incentive contracts but does not use the
stronger language appearing in the 1962 version. The problem has not
changed, however --only the statement of it.
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Another consideration is the decision-making parameters to be used
by the contractor during the period when the original ones are being re -evalu-
ated. Decisions based on the original parameters might be detrimental to
the procurement agency; however, these are the only existing ones and, from
the contractor's standpoint, those which determine his profit.
It appears that the solution to the problem of multiple incentive con-
tracts lies in removing the several parameters from the contract itself and
replacing them with the single constraint of cost. Since cost is invariably
affected by other elements, the government retains most of the control it has
had under the multiple incentive contract. A separate document could be
used to inform the contractor of the priorities that the government assigns
to each element and would be the standard against which the contractor's
performance would be measured.
This method would provide for flexibility. The contractor would be
aware that his performance is being evaluated against known standards, and
he is subject to a definite cost constraint. When a change is introduced, the
cost constraint is changed to effect it. During the interim period when new
parameters are being developed, the contractor would base decisions on the
cost constraint which, while not necessarily perfect, does measurably con-
trol the interacting variables.
The recommended method is not an optimum solution to maintaining
complete control together with full flexibility. The approach, however,










Cost reduction is not the result of pure chance. Contractors may-
spend considerable funds in seeking ways to reduce costs through improved
management information systems, manufacturing methods, etc. Wider use
of incentive contracts should encourage cost reduction efforts since the con-
tractor stands to participate in the savings. Whether or not this will come
about is dependent on the actions of contracting officers.
One of the unwritten but accepted standards for evaluating a con-
tracting officer's performance is the percentage of profit paid on a contract.
Traditionally the fees paid on cost-plus -fixed-fee contracts have been lim-
ited, by design or otherwise, to the very narrow range of 6 to 7 per cent.
The exceptions to this are considerably rarer than could be accounted for
by chance. The same unwritten standard, if applied to incentive contracts,
will weaken their effectiveness.
An example will be helpful in developing this point. Assume that a
contractor, through a company-funded program, manages a significant
cost reduction. Instead of the targeted fee of 7 per cent, he earns 10 per
cent. The additional 3 per cent does not, however, recover all the costs
incurred in developing the cost reduction program. If, during the follow-on
contract negotiation, the contracting officer adheres to the unwritten stand-
ard and sets a target of 7 per cent using the past actual cost as a base, the
incentive for improving performance will be destroyed. He must take into
account that the contractor incurred additional costs to improve performance
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and that he anticipated recovering these costs plus a profit for so doing.
Subsequent contract terms which are designed to lower the contractor's
profit to the traditional level will eliminate the contractor's interest in
generating further improved performance.
The Defense Department must be willing to support contracting
officers who permit comparatively high profits. Since profits represent
only a small portion of the total price paid by the government on any one






There is no question that the government 'regulates ' the defense indus-
try. This regulation, like those of railroads and public utilities, is considered
to be in the public interest. Unlike those other business activities, however,
there is no independent regulatory commission before which the interested
parties can present their case. The regulation is unilateral and accomplished
through law, regulations, and, to some extent, administration policy. These
laws, regulations, and policies are established not only to protect the public
purse but also to carry out social and economic objectives. The burden
placed on the defense industry in compliance with many of the laws not
directly concerned with increasing procurement efficiency is a heavy one. In
such an environment the defense industry cannot be expected to act with the
drive, efficiency, and flexibility that characterize private enterprise.
An unknown cartoonist illustrated the situation with a caricature of
the defense industry as a mule carrying the heavy load of the small business
program, geographical distribution of contracts, and labor surplus require-
ments. The mule is also tied down with ropes labeled: incremental funding,
Buy American, PERT, security requirements, and program definition. A




off as a result of unallowable costs and renegotiation. Is it any wonder that
the mule doesn't move '
These conflicts have arisen from the piecemeal approach followed in
formulating procurement laws and regulations. The problem can be solved
by viewing it as a whole and not separate and independent parts. A compre-
hensive study of the laws and regulations influencing procurement should be
undertaken. This government study should have as its purpose the determi-
nation of the relative value of each of these as contrasted with its detrimental
effect on procurement efficiency. Those laws and regulations designed for
social or economic motives that do not offset in the broader picture the added
burden imposed on procurement should be eliminated. Until this approach is
taken, true efficiency will remain largely a myth.
Long-run Incentives
With the one exception of contractor performance evaluation, the pres'
ent incentive system is tied to the short-run situation. Contractor perform-
ance evaluation, however, is not necessarily effective over the long run.
History shows that contractors are selected on the basis of the technical and
financial attractiveness of their proposals and their capacity to undertake the
program. Past performance is relevant only when competitive proposals are
equally attractive.
Past performance has furthermore been shown to be, at best, a very
unreliable indicator of future performance, and government procurement
personnel are well aware of this fact. In consideration of these factors, it
\
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seems most unlikely that the contractor performance evaluation program will
be a long-run incentive of measurable significance.
The present short-run incentives written into each contract are also of
questionable valee. As shown in the previous chapter, the cost-plus -incentive-
fee contract can actually act as a reverse incentive to incur overruns. The
same reverse incentive can encourage the contractor to incur costs up to the
established ceiling even under a i'ixed-price-incentive contract.
The problem arises from the fact that government procurement per-
sonnel attempt to minimize the costs over the short -run term of the contract
while contractors are generally interested in maximizing profits over the long
run. The objectives of both parties are in opposition. Stronger long-run
incentives would eliminate most of the potential for reverse incentives.
One possible solution to this problem is negotiating contracts for more
than a single year; this would require a change in the present law which states
that aircraft missiles and ships shall be procured on an annual basis.
Multi-year contracts would prevent the practice by contracting officers
of lowering targets based on the previous year's performance. This improve-
ment alone should encourage intensive cost reduction efforts.
Studies by Scherer have pointed out that poor performance seldom
affects the market position of a defense firm. A reluctance to strongly
penalize firms with unsatisfactory performance records, despite the over-
capacity of the industry, points up the fact that the strongest long-run incen-
tive, that of survival, has not been used.
.
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If firms which consistently performed unsatisfactorily were not
awarded contracts and therefore forced out of business, it would serve as a
powerful reminder to others that their continued existence was strongly tied
to their long-run performance.
Adoption of direct costing to pricing government contracts would also
eliminate reverse incentives. By relating the government's contribution to
the firm's fixed costs directly to past performance, and basing profits on
control of variable costs, the contractor would be simultaneously operating
under both long- and short-run incentives.
Exception to Renegotiation
As long as incentive contracts are subject to review by the Renegotia-
tion Board, the contractor has no substantial incentives to achieve superior
performance. He is constantly faced with the prospect that beyond a point,
unknown to him, the profits earned under such contracts will not only be taken
away, but he will simultaneously incur the heavy costs incident to the renego-
tiation process.
In view of the extensive safeguards provided by the pre-award process,
the need for review of incentive contracts is questionable. At the very mini-
mum, the uncertainty of what constitutes excessive profits under incentive
contracts should be eliminated. Specific criteria should be established and
at a profit level sufficiently high to encourage defense firms to take full






There are many dichotomies in the laws, regulations, and policies
affecting procurement and the fundamental objective of obtaining the most
defense for the dollar. The more evident of these discrepancies have been
pointed out in this study and general approaches to their solution have been
recommended. In a word, they call for improving the incentive system.
Profit incentives have been invaluable in the development of private
industry. If administered properly by the government within a reasonable
regulatory environment, they offer the best hope for achieving desired pro-
curement goals. The only alternative to effective profit incentives may well
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